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In this paper, we investigate the link between intra-household resource allocation and fa-
milial ties between household members. We show that, within the same geographic, economic
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households) achieve near Pareto efficient allocation of productive resources and Pareto efficient
allocation of consumption while households with ‘weaker’ familial ties (extended family house-
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1 Introduction
The question as to how resources are allocated within households has long been of interest to
economists. Particularly in societies where state support and market institutions are weak, the
household remains an important unit of production, and investment in the human capital of chil-
dren.
The two models of intra-household allocation that have received the most attention in the liter-
ature and tested most frequently using household data are the unitary and the collective household
models. The unitary model, which assumes that the household acts as a single decision unit max-
imizing a common utility function, has been consistently rejected by empirical evidence (reviewed
by Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman 1997, Doss 2013). In contrast to the unitary model, the
collective model allows the representation of individual behavior within the household. Chiappori
(1988, 1992) has shown that simply assuming Pareto efficient allocations implies a set of testable re-
strictions. The basic model has been extended in several directions, including household production
(e.g. Udry 1996) and children (e.g. Thomas 1990), among others.
The empirical tests of the collective household model, however, have been less consistent than
those of the unitary household model. Attanasio and Lechene (2014), Bobonis (2009), Browning,
Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Chiappori, Fortin
and Lacroix (2002) and Rangel and Thomas (2005), among others, fail to reject Pareto efficiency of
intrahousehold resource allocations in various contexts. On the other hand, Dercon and Krishnan
(2000), Duflo and Udry (2004), Goldstein and Udry (2008), and Udry (1996) reject efficient intra-
household resource allocations. A broad pattern emerges, however, from these seemingly conflicting
empirical results. On the one hand, the studies that reject Pareto efficiency are concentrated in
Africa and have tended to focus on household productive resources (e.g. Udry, 1996; Goldstein and
Udry, 2008; Kazianga and Wahhaj, 2013; Guirkinger et al., 2015). On the other hand, studies that
fail to reject efficiency tend to focus on consumption in developing countries (e.g. Bobonis, 2009;
Attanasio and Lechene, 2014) or labour supply in developed countries.
It has been widely noted that a key element of interactions within a household is their repeated
and regular nature. Game theoretic reasoning implies that individuals who expect to interact
repeatedly into the future should be able to sustain greater levels of cooperation compared to those
who interact sporadically. If household members care about future outcomes sufficiently, then they
will be able to achieve efficiency in consumption and production decisions (Browning and Chiappori,
1988; Udry 1996; Duflo and Udry, 2004). This reasoning would apply to all individuals living under
the ‘same roof’, whatever the nature of familial or kinship ties between them.
However, if cooperation between household members are sustained through altruism, or norms
of familial rights and obligations, then households with different types of familial composition may
well diverge in their behaviour. For example, if individuals exhibit higher levels of altruism towards
members of their nuclear family unit, then nuclear family households may be able to achieve more
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efficient outcomes than households consisting of extended family members or unrelated individuals.
Despite a growing literature, there remain significant gaps in our understanding of the role of
extended families and kinship networks in economic interactions (see Cox and Fafchamps 2008 for
a review; and di Falco and Bulte (2011, 2013), Baland et al. (2013) for recent work on sub-Saharan
Africa). Furthermore, this literature is largely focused on extended family members who inhabit
separate households but not on cohabiting members of the same extended family. By contrast,
there is scarce evidence on whether or how family ties affect intra-household allocation.
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on intra-household allocation and the role of familial
ties in economic outcomes in two ways. First, we show, within the same geographic, economic and
social environments, that – conditional on the co-residence decision – individuals with ‘stronger’
familial ties achieve near Pareto efficient allocation of productive resources and Pareto efficient
allocation of consumption within the household while individuals with ‘weaker’ familial ties do not.
Thus, we are able to reconcile two strands of empirical evidence in the literature that have either
failed to reject or have rejected Pareto efficient allocation of household resources. This is in line
with early research by Lundberg (1988) who attempted to relate labour supply of husbands and
wives in the US labour market to the household structure. She found evidence that husbands and
wives without pre-school children behaved like separate individuals in determining their labour
supply, while families with young children appeared to determine labour supply jointly. More
recently, Angelucci and Garlick (2015) found evidence of Pareto efficient consumption allocation
for households with relatively old heads but not for households with relatively young heads.
Second, we develop a theoretical model where we explicitly link the household decision-making
process to the nature of familial ties within the household and account for the observed differences
in efficiency between household with ‘stronger’ familial ties and those with ‘weaker’ familial ties.
In the rest of the paper, we refer to households with ‘stronger’ familial ties as ‘nuclear’ family
households; i.e. households consisting of the head, his spouse or spouses and their children, and we
refer to households with ‘weaker’ familial ties as extended family households, i.e. households that
include at least one member in addition to the nuclear unit.
The setting for the empirical analysis in this paper is rural Burkina Faso. Agricultural house-
holds in Burkina Faso provide an interesting setting for exploring the topic because of the diversity
of family ties that exist within the same household (discussed in Section 4) and the practice of
assigning farm plots, individually, to adult household members for which they control production
choices, as well as the proceeds of farm output (Udry 1996). Besides these ‘private’ plots, the
household farms on one or more ‘collective’ plots, under the management of the household head
(Kazianga and Wahhaj, 2013). According to a social norm, each able household member is expected
to contribute some labour to the ‘collective farm’ and the head is expected to use its proceeds for
expenditures on household public goods (Hammond 1966; Fiske 1991; Lallemand 1977).
We find that, controlling for plot characteristics and household-crop-year fixed-effects, collective
plots use labour more intensively and achieve higher agricultural yields than private plots. Using
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the test of efficiency in agricultural production based on the approach pioneered by Udry (1996),
we are able to reject the hypothesis of efficiency in production for both extended family households
and nuclear family households. However, (i) yields achieved on private plots in nuclear family
households are close to those achieved on collectively farmed plots while the corresponding gaps in
extended family households are significantly larger. Using data on consumption expenditures by
different household members, we implement two tests of intra-household risk-sharing, based data
on (ii) food consumption expenditures and idiosyncratic shocks to household income, following
Duflo and Udry (2004) and (iii) child anthropometrics and shocks to mothers’ farm income. With
both approaches, we are able to reject the hypothesis of efficient risk-sharing for extended family
households but not for nuclear family households.
Our data-set on agricultural resource allocation allows us to examine which household members
are providing labour on which farm plots and, thus, the role of familial ties in labour allocation.
We find that (iv) household members who share a nuclear family tie provide more labour on each
other’s private farm plots, as compared to household members who share an extended family tie,
or no family ties; (v) for a given relation to the household head, household members provide more
labour on collective farm plots in nuclear family households than in extended family households,
controlling for individual and plot characteristics and household-year fixed-effects.
To explain these empirical patterns, we propose a model of household decision-making in which
nuclear family members exhibit greater altruism towards each other, or a greater alignment of
preferences, compared to a pair of individuals who are unrelated or are connected by extended-
family ties. This assumption can be motivated by the evolutionary approach to altruism and familial
ties, based on the work of Hamilton (1964), as discussed in Cox and Fafchamps (2008). Then,
labour contributions and transfers that nuclear family members make to each other voluntarily
(more precisely a subgame perfect equilibrium) may be sufficient to achieve efficiency in production
and consumption decisions within a nuclear family household. In the case of the extended family
household, such voluntary contributions may be insufficient to achieve the first-best. But the
existence of the social norm described above enables the household head to commit to using the
output of the collective farm for the well-being of the entire household. This leads to a distortion
of productive resources in favour of the collective farm but enables the household to achieve a
second-best allocation.
If nuclear family households are able to allocate resources more efficiently, it raises the question
why do extended family households exist at all? To this question, we are able to provide two
types of answers based on the available data. First, in a setting where labour markets function
poorly or are non-existent, co-habitation can provide the basis of labour exchange (Berry 1993),
allowing more effective monitoring of labour by the head, as well as the remuneration in the form of
private plots and provision of household public goods. Second, in the absence of formal insurance
and lack of effective risk-sharing arrangements between households, an additional member allows
greater income diversification and improves the ability of the household to engage in consumption
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smoothing. The addition of a extended-family member or unrelated individual to the household
may reduce efficiency but would nevertheless increase net welfare if these benefits are sufficiently
high. Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that (vi) households where the head has more
inherited land, and consequently the marginal product of labour is higher, is more likely to include
the co-residence of extended family members and unrelated individuals; (vii) household heads
exposed to greater income volatility due to the characteristics of their inherited land and local
rainfall conditions are more likely to end up with extended-family households; (viii) household
food consumption is more sensitive to shocks to agricultural income in the case of nuclear family
households than in the case of extended family households.
Extended family households, on average, have more members; and a head who is more likely to
by polygynous and, on average, older. To investigate whether the differences in resource allocation
between the two groups of households are due to these observed differences, we replicate the tests
of efficiency in production and consumption for subsamples in which nuclear and extended family
households are identical or similar along these dimensions. The pattern of results described above
persists for these subsamples.
It is important to recognise that the individuals in our data are self-selecting into different
household structures, and this selection process may itself contribute to differences in efficiency
between nuclear and extended family households. For example, if individuals more skilled at coop-
eration self-select into nuclear family households, this could also generate the observed patterns in
consumption efficiency, and farm yields and labour use intensity across farm plots. (It would not
explain, however, our results regarding individual labour contributions – described in (iv) above –
where we compare across different familial ties within extended family households only). There-
fore, strictly speaking, the differences in intra-household allocation between nuclear and extended
family households we report in the paper include both the direct effects of familial ties and the
potential selection effects. Nevertheless, we put forward the theory on family ties and altruism as
a parsimonious explanation for the combined evidence regarding labour use across farm plots, plot
yields and consumption risk-sharing as described in (i)-(v) above.
Foster and Rosenzweig (2002) develop and test a theory of household division using Indian
village data, in which preference heterogeneity among household members also plays an important
role. Specifically, since household public goods must, by definition, be consumed in the same
quantity by families residing in ‘joint households’, those who have different preferences regarding
private and household public goods have incentives to break away and form a household unit on
its own. However, Foster and Rosenzweig (2002) assume that the allocation of resources within
the joint household is efficient, and do not investigate whether and how family ties affect resource
allocation within the joint household. By contrast, given the large body of evidence pointing to
an inefficient allocation of resources within agricultural households in sub-Saharan Africa, we posit
that the intra-household allocation of resources is a subgame perfect equilibrium and estimate the
level of altruism (or alignment of preferences) between household members using data on labour
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allocation across farm plots.
Guirkinger and Platteau (2014) develop a theory to explain both household division and in-
dividualisation of farm plots for agricultural households in West Africa, using the idea of ‘moral
hazard in teams’ in collective farm work. While a similar mechanism may be at work for our sample
of households in Burkina Faso, it would not explain why collective farm plots achieve higher yields
than private farm plots. In particular, the distribution of plot yields across farm plots within the
same household correspond closely to the distribution of labour for our sample; and therefore, we
analyse the data within a theoretical framework which can account for the labour allocation choices.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we describe the evolution
of household structure in West Africa during the last twenty years using household-level data and
discuss possible reasons for these changes. The theoretical framework is developed in Section 3. The
data used in our analysis is described in Section 4. Section 5 investigates plot yields and allocation
of labour across different types of farm plots managed by the same household and compares the
dispersion in yields across different types of households. We implement tests of efficient risk-sharing
using food consumption and child anthropometrics data in Section 6. Alternative explanations for
the pattern of results are explored in Section 7 and alternative theories are discussed in Section
8. In Section 9, we discuss possible explanations for the presence of extended-family households in
West Africa, and provide evidence regarding these explanations. Section 10 concludes.
2 Evolution of Household Composition in West Africa
We define a nuclear family household as one that consists only of the household head, his wife or
wives and their children. Extended family households would include at least one individual who
does not belong to the household head’s nuclear family. In the African context, a household may
be composed of one or more ‘cooking units’, embedded within a ‘farming group’ (i.e. a group of
individuals who farm together) and a dwelling group (Goody, 1989).
Extended family households can arise from married sons or siblings who decide to raise their
own families within their father’s or brother’s household and from other adult relatives who decide
to join the households (see, for example, Coulson, 1962; Adepoju, 2005; Young and Ansell, 2008).
Child-fostering, a practice which is widely observed in sub-Saharan Africa, would also lead to
extended family households according to our definition (Akresh 2009).
Widespread market failure in rural labour markets means that family or household members
are, commonly, the main source of farm labour for small-holder agricultural households in sub-
Saharan Africa. This has historically provided an impetus for the cohabitation of individuals who
do not belong to the same nuclear family (Berry 1993).
Rising land pressures, it has been argued, are one of the key drivers behind the individualisation
of land tenure which, in turn, can cause agricultural households to split up into smaller farming units
(see, for example, Guirkinger and Platteau 2014 and the references within). The same pressures,
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coupled with the growth of income-earning opportunities outside of agriculture would make it
more difficult for agricultural households to hold on to its working members with the promise of
land assets or future claims on the earnings generated by these assets. To the extent that there are
stronger ties between members of a nuclear family than between members of the extended family and
unrelated individuals, these pressures can lead to an evolution of agricultural households towards
the nuclear family model.
The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), which provides data on household composition
across countries in different years using consistent definitions, allow us to examine how the preva-
lence of nuclear family households is evolving over time. Looking at the 9 countries in West Africa
which had three or more DHS surveys by September 2014 – Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire,
Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal – we find that the share of nuclear family house-
holds rose in 5 of them during the period 1993-2013. It has remained stable in 3 countries and has
declined in one country (Ghana). The multiplication of urban households, by itself, cannot account
for these changes; the pattern persists when we restrict the analysis to the rural subsample.1
It is important to recognise that the evolution towards the nuclear family model does not imply
a weakening of the extended family network or kinship-based ties. Indeed, there is a large literature
emphasizing the important role that these networks continue to play in economic affairs in sub-
Saharan Africa (for recent studies on the subject, see, for example, di Falco and Bulte (2011, 2013);
Baland et al. (2013)).
Besides a potential long-term trend towards nuclear family households, household composition
may be affected by the periodic migration of individual members as a way of coping with income
seasonality and weather-related shocks such as droughts (Findley 1994; Cordell et al., 1996; Henry
et al. 2004). Thus, the cohabitation of extended family members and unrelated individuals may be
a recurring and persistent phenomenon. More generally, it is important to recognise that whether,
at any point in time, a household is composed of a nuclear family unit or not is endogenous to
the migration decisions of its members and, thus, nuclear and extended family households can po-
tentially differ in terms of their members’ preferences, endowments and past shocks. While we do
not account for this explicitly in our theoretical modelling and empirical analysis, our interpreta-
tion of the observed differences in intra-household allocation between nuclear and extended-family
households need to be informed by these potential selection effects.
3 Theoretical Framework: Intra-household Allocation of Land,
Labour and Consumption Expenditures
Consider a household consisting of n adult members represented by the set I = {1, 2, ., n}. The
household has total farm land of area A and average quality q which is to be allocated among the
different household members and, potentially, a ‘collective’ plot. Each household member i has a
1See Table 1 in Kazianga and Wahhaj (2016).
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time endowment of Ei which he or she would allocate to labour across the different farm plots after
the land has been divided up. There is no agricultural labour market and therefore all plots must
be farmed using household labour.
We denote by Aj ,qj the size and quality, respectively, of household plot j ∈ {1, .., n, c}. Here,
j = c denotes a collective plot, and j ∈ I represents the private plot assigned to household member
j. We denote by Lmj and Lfj the total amounts of male and female labour, respectively, allocated
to plot j. We assume, for simplicity, that the crop grown and the agricultural technology employed,
is the same across all plots. Agricultural output from plot j is given by yj = F (qj , Aj , Lmj , Lfj , r)
where F (.) is a Cobb-Douglas production function:
F (qj , Aj , Lmj , Lfj , r) = R (qj , r) (Aj)
α (Lmj)
β1 (Lfj)
β2 for j ∈ {1, .., n, c} (1)
and r is a stochastic vector of relevant measures of rainfall. The function R (.) allows the effect of
rainfall on output to, potentially, vary according to land quality. Let y =(y1, .., yn, yc) denote the
income levels of the household from its different agricultural plots. The proceeds from the farms
can be spent on private goods or a household public good. We denote by z total expenditures on
the household public good and by xip total expenditures on private good p consumed by household
member i. We use a CES utility function to represent preferences as follows:
U i (x1, ..,xn, z; δi) =








for i ∈ I (2)




δij , δji ∈ [0, 1] capture the level of altruism between household members i and j and δic, δjc their
relative preferences for household public goods. If δij = δji = 0, then household members i and j
do not care at all about each other’s private consumption. On the other hand, if If δij = δji = 1
and δic = δjc, then their preferences are perfectly aligned.
A full description of intra-household resource allocation should specify how the household’s
land is divided between its farm plots, which we represent by the vectors A =(Ac, A1, .., An), and
q =(qc, q1, .., qn); the labour contribution by each household member i across these farm plots,








; and expenditures on the household public good z and pri-
vate goods (x1, ..,xn). The Collective Household Model implies efficiency in household production
choices and perfect risk-sharing in consumption choices. The existing literature provides economet-
ric tests of these hypotheses (Udry 1996; Duflo and Udry, 2004) which we implement in Sections
5 and 6 respectively. In the following section, we develop an alternative model where decisions are
made in a non-cooperative manner – i.e. there is no binding agreement regarding intra-household
allocation.
2Note that we abstract away from leisure in modelling preferences. Introducing leisure has no implications for
our theoretical results on labour and consumption as long as leisure is additively separable from other consumption
goods in the utility function. Therefore, for ease of exposition, we ignore leisure in the following presentation.
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3.1 Non-Cooperative Decision-Making between Altruistic Household Members
We assume the following timing of events and decisions during an agricultural season: (1) household
composition is determined – i.e. existing household members may opt to leave and new individuals
may join it – prior to the onset of the agricultural season; (2) the household head divides up the
available land among members of the household and, potentially, a collective plot; (3) rainfall for
the agricultural season is realised; (4) household members choose their labour contributions across
farm plots; (5) output on each farm plot is realised and household members decide how to spend the
proceeds from their private plots; the head decides how to spend the proceeds from the collective
plot.
Rainfall patterns can potentially affect migration from rural households – and thus their com-
position – but the literature suggests that this is more likely to occur following harvest and before
the start of planting for a new season – i.e. the period when there is limited demand for agricultural
labour from the household (Findley 1994; Cordell et al., 1996; Henry et al. 2004).3 Our main anal-
ysis focuses on agricultural labour and consumption decisions. Therefore, based on the reasoning
above, we take household composition as being fixed by the start of the agricultural season, and
investigate the role of family ties, if any, on the subsequent allocation of labour and consumption
within the household. We discuss the long-term determinants of household composition in Section
9.
Following the ethnographic literature, we assume that there is a social norm that prescribes
that the proceeds from the collective plot be spent on household public goods.4 The norm can
potentially incentivise other household members to provide labour on the collective plot (in the
knowledge that they wil derive some utility from its proceeds). Modelling the social norm is not
essential for deriving the key predictions of the model but it simplifies the analysis. Furthermore,
it provides a rationale for the presence of collective plots, which are widely prevalent in the study
area (see Section 4). We assume that violating the social norm can have costly social consequences
and, therefore, the head always acts according to the norm. Thus, we have z ≥ yc.
Each household member i has a reservation utility which they can obtain if they exit the
household. Therefore, for other members remain within the household, the head has to ensure that
each is able to attain at least his or her reservation utility in expectation from the intra-household
allocation of land, and subsequent labour and consumption choices within the household. The
head cannot commit ex-ante (i.e. before production takes place) to making private transfers from
any farm plots over which he retains control. We assume that household members’ production
and consumption choices constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which we solve for using
backward induction.
3It is possible that migration can occur, and affect household composition, even during the agricultural season in
drought years, but our analysis is based on data from surveys conducted in 2010-12 which were not subject to such
extreme weather events.
4See references in the introduction and the discussion in Kazianga and Wahhaj (2013).
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Given a vector of realised incomes y, the consumer optimisation problem for a household mem-
ber i can be written as
max
z,xi
U i (x1, ..,xn, z; δi) subject to z +
p¯∑
p=1
xip ≤ z−i + yi , z ≥ z−i (3)
where z−i equals sum of expenditures on the household public good by all other household members.
It can be shown that if, in equilibrium, a subset of household members Iz ⊂ I make positive









yz for each j ∈ Iz, p = 1, 2, .., p (4)
where yz = yc+
∑
j∈Iz
yj and Λ, ζjpc are constants.
5 In other words, the resources of household mem-
bers in Iz are pooled together although their expenditure decisions are made in a non-cooperative
manner. This is akin to the ‘income neutrality’ result obtained by Bergstrom, Blume and Var-
ian (1986) when investigating the private provision of public goods. For the remaining household
members j ∈ I − Iz, we have xjp = ζpv (Λv)
−1 yj where Λv, ζpv are constants.
6 We denote by z (y)
and xip (y), i ∈ I, p = 1, 2, .., p, the household’s expenditures on different goods as a function of
its income from the different household plots, and let xi (y) = (xi1 (y) , .., xip (y)).
Labour Use Intensity: Given an intra-household distribution of landA,q and level of rainfall
r. we can write the labour optimisation problem for a household member i as follows:
max
Li
U i (x1 (y) , ..,xn (y) , z (y) ; δi) (5)
subject to
yj = F (qj , Aj , Lmj , Lfj , r) for each j ∈ I and j = c
Ei ≥ Lc + L
i






Lkj and Lfj =
∑
k∈If
Lkj . Given the pooling of resources from the collective
plot and the private plots in Iz, optimisation requires household members to allocate labour across
these plots to equate the corresponding marginal products of labour. Therefore, the allocation of
labour across these plots will be efficient. As for the remaining private plots, consider household
members i, j /∈ Iz, i male and j female, who both contribute labour to the collective plot and each
other’s private plots. We obtain the following equations from the first-order conditions to (5) (the


























































. The term δˆic captures i’s incentive to provide
labour on the collective plot, taking into account one’s own preference for the household public
good, as represented by δic, and the fact that income from private plots in Iz are pooled together
with that from the collective plot.7 Then we obtain a relationship between the labour use intensity



































































































According to equations (8) and (9), any differences in the use of male labour (per unit area) is
due to differences in plot characteristics and the differential effects of rainfall, relative preferences
for household public goods versus private goods, and (lack of) altruism between household members
(as represented by δij and δji). If δij = δji = 1 and δic = δjc, then preferences across household
members are identical and we obtain an efficient allocation of labour across farm plots. We can
represent lower levels of altruism by using smaller values of δij or δji and this would lead to a
widening gap in the intensity of labour use between the private plots and the collective plot, in
favour of the collective plot. Equivalent results for female labour use intensities are shown in the
Theoretical Appendix.
Having derived household expenditures as a function of income, and labour allocation as a func-
tion of intra-household land allocation and rainfall, we can obtain intra-household land allocation
that is optimal from the head’s point of view and provides every other household member their
reservation utility. We do not discuss the land distribution in further detail here as its relation
to intra-household altruism is theoretically ambiguous.8 Note that equations (8) and (9) relate to
total labour on farm plots; they do not pin down individual labour contributions. However, the
same equations can serve to analyse individual labour contributions if we impose some additional
structure on the model. We show how this can be done in the Theoretical Appendix.
Plot Yields: Using equations (8) and (9), we can also compute the gap in yields between the
7Note that if Iz = ∅ (i.e. no household member contributes to the household public good), then yz = yc and δˆic =
δic. In this case, i’s only incentive to contribute on the collective plot is based on his or her own preference for the
household public good.
8Please see Kazianga and Wahhaj (2016) for further details.
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and Γ′ = 1+ρα1−ρ(1−α) . From (10) and (11), we find that any differences
in yields between the collective plots and the private plots are, once again, due to differences in
plot characteristics, relative preferences between household public goods and private goods, and
altruism between household members. If δij = δji = 1 then, allowing for differences due to plot
characteristics, and preferences for household public goods, the yields across collective plots and
private plots are identical as implied by efficiency in agricultural production. For lower values of
δij and δji, a yield gap opens up in favour of the collective plot.
Most importantly, equations (10) and (11) – and the corresponding equations for labour use
intensities – provide a link between the allocation of productive resources within the household and
the extent of altruism between household members, which can be investigated with plot-level data
from agricultural households. We discuss and implement empirical tests implied by these equations
in Section (5).
Intra-household Transfers and Consumption Risk-sharing: As per the production func-
tion in (1), the effects of rainfall on farm output can depend on plot quality. This means that house-
hold members with private plots of varying quality are potentially subject to idiosyncratic shocks.
Therefore, they can benefit from an intra-household risk-sharing agreement. Such an agreement can
take the form of a set of state-contingent transfers {τ1 (y) , .., τn (y)} from each household member
to a common fund satisfying the condition
∑n
i=1 τi (y) = 0 for each y. We can show that, given
such an agreement, equation (4) continues to hold for individuals who contribute to the household
public good, while xjp = ζpv (Λv)
−1 [yj − τj (y)] for those who don’t. It follows that if the transfers
induce every household member to make a positive contribution to z, then we obtain complete









ytot for j ∈ I , p = 1, 2, .., p (12)
where ytot = yc+
∑n
j=1 yj . It is straightforward to show that these consumption levels correspond to
those required for efficient risk-sharing between household members for some set of Pareto weights.
However, there may be no enforcement mechanism to implement a transfer agreement, which
means that risk-sharing has to rely on voluntary transfers between household members. For any
given y, the maximum transfer that i is willing to make in a self-enforcing agreement is increasing
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in δij , because a larger value of δij translates into a stronger preference for the expenditures made
by j.9 Consequently, if δij , δji are sufficiently large, the transfer agreement required for efficient
risk-sharing will be self-enforcing. For low values of δij , δji, some degree of risk-sharing can be
achieved through smaller vountary transfers.
4 Description of Survey and Descriptive Statistics
The dataset we use for the empirical exercise in this paper is composed of a panel of households
surveyed by the Office of Agricultural Statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture in Burkina Faso.
The sample consists of 747 villages with about 6 households per village and is designed to be
nationally representative. The survey rounds that we used were fielded in 2010, 2011 and 2012.
The survey was mainly focused on collecting information related to farming. Hence, it contains
detailed information on household demographics and farm activities, but limited information on
consumption. The enumerators lived in the sampled villages and were instructed to visit the
sample households at the end of each farming activity, i.e. field preparation, planting, weeding
and harvesting. Information relating to each farm plot was obtained from the individual in the
household who had responsibility for it during that season. The collected information includes
farm plot characteristics (farm size, topography, location in relation to the homestead), production
technologies, agricultural inputs and outputs, and farm labour. Importantly for our analysis, the
survey distinguished between household plots managed collectively and plots managed individually.
Each plot owner reported, for each worker who had worked on the plot, the number of person-
labour days that he or she contributed.10 The survey includes information about the identity of the
worker, which allows us to distinguish between workers who were household members (including
the plot owner), and those who did not belong to the household. Most of the farm labour – about
97% per hectare – was provided by household members. Therefore, we disregard outside labour
and focus on the labour provided by household members for the analysis.
The survey did not field a consumption module, but food consumption could be inferred from
the survey modules on crop harvest, livestock and non-farm income. The respondent for each plot
reported the quantity harvested that was consumed, stored or sold and, in case of sales, whether and
how much of the proceeds were used for food purchases. The livestock module provides information
on own consumption of livestock and the amount of revenues from sale of livestock used for food
purchases. Similarly, the module on non-farm activities reports the amount of income used for
food purchases. We use the combined information from these modules to construct three categories
of food consumption: (i) cereals (millet, white and red sorghum, corn, fonio and rice), (ii) pulses
and vegetables, (iii) other food categories. In the case of the consumption of home produce, the
9Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002) and Fafchamps (1992) investigate in detail how changes in preference param-
eters affect the scope of risk-sharing within a group in the absence of external enforcement.
10We have no information on the number of hours of work that constitutes a day of labour but, as these figures
were reported by plot owners rather than workers, it is unlikely that a token amount of labour would be reported as
a “day” of work.
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quantities were converted into monetary values using the village average sale price per unit.
The survey collected information from three income sources: crop income, livestock sales, and
non-farm income. We measure crop income as the total value of harvest. We convert total harvest
into monetary values using the village average sale prices mentioned above. The survey recorded
sales of livestock and non-farm income in monetary values. We add together income from these
three sources to obtain total household income.
Characteristics of Nuclear and Extended Family Households: We use the demographic
information in each survey to distinguish between extended and nuclear family households. Us-
ing the definitions given in the preceding section, we have 8,080 observations of extended family
households and 5,723 observations of nuclear family households from the Ministry of Agriculture
survey, as shown in Table 2.11 On average, extended family households are larger, consisting of
11.78 household members versus 7.30 for nuclear family households.12 But this difference is almost
exactly accounted for by the average number of extended family members in the former households
(4.59). Furthermore, extended family households have significantly more married men (1.76 versus
1.04) and the household head have significantly more wives (1.57 versus 1.47). The head in ex-
tended family households is also slightly older and marginally more likely to be literate. Turning
to the farm characteristics in the table, we see that extended family households have significantly
more land, and have, on average, more farm plots under cultivation in a specific year.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics by farm plot, broken down by plot-type (i.e. private
plots and collective plots) and by household-type (nuclear family households and extended family
households). Collective plots managed by the household head are an order of magnitude larger than
the other plots (average area of 4.21 hectares as compared to 0.50 hectares for male private plots)
but labour use intensity and yields are broadly similar across all types of plots. Collective plots in
extended family households are significantly larger than in nuclear family households, but nuclear
family households allocate a slightly larger share of household farm land to the collective plots.
The yield gap between the most productive and the least productive type of plots is larger within
extended family households.13 This suggests that extended family households may be relatively
less efficient than nuclear family households in allocating its productive resources. We will revisit
these issues in the econometric analyses.
Shadow Price of Family Land and Labour: The data on labour and land allocation within
the household allows us to calculate how much labour an adult household member contributes to the
household’s collective plots per unit of land it receives for private farming. In the absence of labour
11The survey manual defines a household as a “group of individuals usually linked by ties of blood or marriage,
usually living together and producing together, where budgetary authority, at least in theory, lies with a single person
within the group called the ‘household head”’ (Burkinabe Ministry of Agriculture, Manuel de l’enqueteur, Enquete
Permanente Agricole, 2009; authors’ translation).
12For the purpose of the survey, household members included those who had been living with the household at
least six months or had the intension of doing so, and excluded those who had been absent six months or more.
13For nuclear households, the ratio of the least productive plots (female plots) to the most productive plots (male
plots) is 0.89. In extended households the ratio of the least productive plots (female plots) to the most productive
plots (head managed common plots) is 0.86.
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contribution by household members, the head would have to hire workers to work on the collective
plot; and in the absence of the land that these household members receive from the household head
for private farming, they would, at least in theory, have to make use of land markets. Therefore,
the ratio described above can be regarded as the ”shadow price of land” within the household or
the inverse of the ”shadow price of labour”.14 Table 4 summarizes the “shadow” prices of land and
labour implied by the allocation of land and labour discussed above. On average, nuclear family
household members contribute 263 days of labour on collective plots per hectare of land (allocated
for private farming) while extended household members contribute 209 days of labour on collective
plots for one hectare of land. Looking at the shadow price by gender, we find that men and women
in extended family households contribute, respectively, 446 and 181 days of labour per hectare of
land while the corresponding figures for nuclear family households are 320 and 159. Overall, the
patterns are consistent with the hypothesis that household heads are able to extract more labour
from nuclear family members. Another interpretation of these patterns is that the household head’s
commitment to allocate the proceeds from the collective plots to household public goods is more
credible (e.g. because of stronger altruism) in nuclear family households than for extended family
households, and this induces household members to voluntarily contribute more labour on collective
plots.
5 Household Agricultural Production
Informational asymmetry and commitment problems can prevent household members from engag-
ing in the exchange of productive resources – e.g. land, labour and other agricultural inputs – and
therefore prevent efficiency in household production (Udry 1996). In this context, altruism within
the household can induce voluntary intra-household transfers and enable the household to achieve a
more efficient allocation of resources in the spirit of the well-known ‘Rotten Kid Theorem’ (Becker
1993). One of the key distinguishing features between extended family households and nuclear
family households, besides household size and the demographic composition, is, potentially, the
level of altruism between household members. Therefore, we investigate whether these two types
of households differ in terms of their efficiency in agricultural production.
We implement a test of efficiency in household production using the approach first adopted
by Udry (1996). Specifically, we estimate a farm plot yield equation which includes household
characteristics, physical characteristics of the plot and features of plot ownership, as follows:
Qhtci = Xhciβ +Ghiγ + λhtc + εhtci (13)
where Qhtci is the log of yield on plot i in year t, planted to crop c and belonging to household
h; Xhci is a vector of physical characteristics of plot i including the plot area, topography and
14The previous literature has highlighted the practice of labour and land ‘exchanges’ within the family – albeit in
the context of bequests – in the case of India and Israel (Rosenzweig 1985; Rosenzweig 1988; Kimhi 2004). A number
of studies on West Africa have also emphasized that the contribution of labour to collective farm plots constitutes
part of an intrahousehold exchange (see, for example, Von Braun and Webb 1989).
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location in relation to the household; λhtc is a household-crop-year fixed effect; and Ghi is a vector
of characteristics of plot i in household h including, for example, the gender of the person responsible
for the plot and whether the plot is classified as being ‘collective’ or ‘private’.
Equation (13) can also be seen as an empirical equivalent of equations (10) and (11), which
provide a specific interpretation to yield differentials between collective plots and private plots.
They imply that, after controlling for plot characteristics and household-crop-year fixed-effects, the
remaining differentials can be attributed to relative preferences for household public goods, and
the level of altruism towards the private plot owner by other household members.
Table 3 shows the estimated results for equation (13), using agricultural data from the survey.
In these regressions, we divide the farm plots into three categories: (i) household collective plots,
(ii) private plots managed by male household members, and (iii) private plots managed by female
household members. We find that the yields achieved on private plots managed by men and women
are lower than that achieved on household collective plots (the omitted category) and the differences
are statistically significant at the 1% level in each instance. This holds true for the full sample
of households (regression results shown in column 1 of the table) as well as for the subsample of
extended family households (column 2) and nuclear family households (column 3).
Pareto efficiency would imply that yields across all three plot categories are equal, after control-
ling for the crops planted, the physical characteristics of the plot and the skills of the plot owner.
An F-test for the hypothesis that the yields are the same across all three plot categories is strongly
rejected for both extended family households and nuclear family households (yielding an F-statistic
of 244.8 in the first case, and 53.25 in the second case). The rejection of efficiency in household
production is consistent with findings in the existing literature (Udry 1996; Goldstein and Udry,
2008; Kazianga and Wahhaj, 2013; Guirkinger et al., 2015; Akresh et al., 2016).
In words, these households are achieving significantly higher yields on collective plots compared
to private plots which have been planted with the same crops, controlling for observable physical
characteristics of the plot and the plot owner. But the divergence in plot yields between collective
plots and private plots is higher for extended family households than for nuclear family households.
The estimated coefficients imply that, relative to household collective plots, private male plots
achieve yields which are 24% lower in extended family households and 13% lower in nuclear family
households; the corresponding figures for female plot yields are 42% and 29% respectively.
The gender difference in plot yields has been noted in the previous literature, with potential
explanations provided by Goldstein and Udry (2008) and Kazianga and Wahhaj (2013). However,
the gap between extended family and nuclear family households is just as striking. If we assume
that members of the nuclear family exhibit higher levels of altruism towards one another than
towards extended family members and unrelated individuals, these patterns are consistent with the
theoretical predictions.
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5.1 Plot Yield Dispersions
We can also use the data on plot yields to see graphically the variation in plot yields across different
plots within nuclear family households and within extended family households. In Figure 1, we plot
the residuals from estimations of equation (13) without Ghi – i.e. without the male and female-
plot dummies, and the age and education of the plot manager. The resulting graphs show the
distribution of plot yields for farm plots belonging to the same household and planted to the same
crop, in the same year, after controlling for physical characteristics of the plots.
For comparison, we also show the residuals from corresponding regressions for the pooled sample
with (i) village-crop-year fixed effects, and (ii) individual-crop-year fixed effects. Greater disper-
sion in the residuals indicates greater inefficiency in the allocation of farm resources within the
relevant group (and more scope for improving output through a reallocation of resources). The
household-level distributions, for both subsamples, lie between the village-level and individual-level
distributions. This is consistent with the findings by Udry (1996) and Kazianga and Wahhaj (2013)
and implies that the household is more efficient than the village at allocating resources across farm
plots that belong to the group, but not as efficient as the individual.
We also see from the figure that there is greater variation in plot yields across apparently
identical plots for extended family households as compared to nuclear family households. The
equality of the two distributions is rejected at any conventional level using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test. The graphs for the nuclear and extended family households are consistent with our estimated
coefficients in the previous section and suggests that nuclear family households are more efficient
at allocating productive resources across farm plots than extended family households.
5.2 Explaining the Plot Yield Gaps across Different Household Types
Why are plot yield dispersions greater in the case of extended family households as compared to
nuclear family households? Table 2 shows that, on average, extended family households have 11.78
members while nuclear family members have 7.30 members, with the difference being strongly
statistically significant. The presence of extended family members in the former group largely
accounts for this difference: on average, extended family household have 4.59 extended family
members while nuclear family households, by definition, have none. The table also shows that,
while there is little difference in the head’s marital status between the two groups, the head in
extended-family households, on average, have more spouses; i.e. they are more likely to be in
polygamous relationships. They are also, on average, slightly older. Therefore, the difference
in household sizes, the extent of polygyny and the presence of extended family members present
themselves as natural candidates to account for the observed difference in plot yield dispersions.
In this section, we investigate the hypothesis relating to the presence of extended-family members
while the alternative hypotheses are investigated in section 7.
We introduce a set of categorical variables to the plot yield regressions indicating the relation
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of the plot owner to the household head. The estimated results for the whole sample, the sample of
extended family households and nuclear family households are shown in Table 4. The omitted plot
category in the table is ‘collective plots managed by the household head’. We introduce a single
category for all other collective plots, and separate categories for private plots farmed by different
relations of the household head. The first point to note for this table is that, even putting aside
the collective plots, the household head achieves a higher yield on private plots compared to other
household members, with the differences being statistically significant.
Being outside of the nuclear family does not, however, seem to be a disadvantage in itself: we
cannot reject the hypotheses that (i) the yield coefficient for the household head’s sons is the same
as that for other male relatives and unrelated male household members; and that (ii) the yield
coefficient for the household head’s daughters is the same as that for other female relatives and
unrelated female household members. This holds true for both the subsample of extended family
households and for the full sample.
The wider dispersion in plot yields in extended family households can be traced to two sources.
First, in nuclear family households, the household head achieves almost the same yield on his private
plots as on the collective plots under his control (the coefficient is not statistically significant)
while in extended family households, the corresponding yield gap is about 19% (and statistically
significant). Second, the yield gap between the head’s collective plots and the private plots farmed
by members of the nuclear family (i.e. the son, daughter and spouse of the household head and
the head himself) is smaller in the case of nuclear family households than for extended family
households. A joint test of equality between the relevant coefficients for the two subsamples is
strongly rejected.
In summary, the wider dispersion of plot yields in extended family households is not due to
the presence of extended family members per se. Rather, it is because the plot yield gap (relative
to the household’s collective plots) is larger for household members in extended family households
than for household members in nuclear family households who hold the same ‘position’ (defined
in terms of their relation to the household head). To better understand the source of these plot
yield differences, we examine how agricultural inputs, in particular farm labour, is allocated across
household plots. We discuss this in the following section.
5.3 Allocation of Labour Across Farm Plots
If the production technology used by agricultural households exhibits diminishing marginal product
of labour, then productivity efficiency requires that farm plots with the same physical characteristics
(including plot size, topography, location, etc.) and planted to the same crops, should make use
of equal amounts of labour. If not, it would be possible to increase output by reallocating labour
towards farm plots with lower labour use intensity. Therefore, we can test for efficiency in labour
allocation across farm plots belonging to the same household by using a specification similar to
(13).
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We estimate the following equation separately for nuclear family and extended family households
and different labour types:
ljhtci = Xhciβ
j +Ghiγ
j + λhtc + ε
j
htci (14)
where ljhtci is the log of the amount of labour of type j applied to plot i per unit area, in year t, and
plot i belongs to household h and is planted to crop c. The labour types include ‘adult male’, ‘adult
female’, ‘child’ and ‘total’. Equation (14) can be regarded as an empirical equivalent of equations
(8) and (9), which imply that the difference in labour use intensity between collective plots and
private plots depend on preferences for household public goods and altruism within the household
towards the private plot owner.
The results are shown in Table 5. First, we observe that the labour use intensity (for total
labour) is significantly higher for the collective plots managed by the household head than for all
other types of plots owned by the household (controlling for plot characteristics and the planted
crop); and this holds for both nuclear family and extended family households. Therefore, these
households are not allocating labour efficiently across farm plots.
Second, the labour use intensity gap between the head’s collective plots and the private plots
farmed by members of the nuclear family (i.e. the son, daughter and spouse of the household
head and the head himself) is smaller in the case of nuclear family households than for extended
family households. A joint test of equality between the relevant coefficients for the two subsamples
is strongly rejected. This is exactly the pattern we obtained in the case of plot yields and is
consistent with the theoretical predictions above.
Turning to extended family households, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the labour use
intensity coefficient (for total labour) of the household head’s sons is the same as that for other male
relatives and unrelated male household members. The corresponding coefficients for the household
head’s daughter, other female relatives and unrelated female household members are very close
(-0.65, -0.68 and -0.72) but estimated precisely enough that we can reject the hypothesis that they
are equal. Nevertheless, the pattern is broadly similar to what we saw in the case of plot yields:
private plots managed by household members who are not part of the head’s nuclear family are
not at a disadvantage relative to those of the head’s own children (of the same gender) in terms of
labour inputs.
In summary, the findings discussed in this section suggests that the wider dispersion of plot
yields within extended family households can be accounted for by the wider dispersion of labour
use intensity within these same households.
Individual Labour Contributions on Privately-Owned Plots
Estimates based on equation (14) reveal the pattern of labour use intensities across farm plots
but they do not tell us how different household members are dividing their own labour across
different plots maintained by the household. To investigate the latter, we estimate the following
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equation using data on labour contributions by individual household members on each farm plot:
ljhtci = Xhtciβj +Wjhtζj+λjhtc + εjhtci (15)
where ljhtci is the log of total labour per unit area provided by individual j in household h on private
plot i planted to crop c in period t. The vector Xhtci includes the characteristics of plot i (as before)
and Wjht includes the worker’s characteristics including gender, age and education; and the error
term εjhtci is clustered at the village level in the estimation. Equation (15) can be regarded as the
empirical equivalent of equations (36) and (37) provided in the Theoretical Appendix.15
The estimated results are shown in Table 9. For extended-family households we estimate equa-
tion (15) separately for workers who belong to the head’s nuclear family (column 2) and those who
don’t (column 1). In each case, we include explanatory variables to indicate the relation of the plot
owner to the head. This allows us to compare labour provided within owner-worker pairs that have
a nuclear family tie to pairs that do not. In column 3, we provide equivalent estimates for nuclear
family households.
The estimated coefficients for plot ownership in column (2) indicate that nuclear family members
allocate more labour on plots owned by the head, head’s spouse, daughter and son than on plots
owned by the head’s non-nuclear relations. By contrast, the estimated coefficients in column (1)
indicate that extended family members allocate less labour on plots owned by members of the
head’s nuclear family than on plots owned by the head’s non-nuclear relations. These differences
are all statistically significant at conventional levels.
Furthermore, comparing the estimated coefficients in columns (1) and (2), we find that - taking
the individual’s labour on his/her own private plot as a reference point - the nuclear family members
allocate more labour on private plots owned by the head, head’s spouse, daughter and son than
do extended family members. On the other hand, extended family members allocate significantly
more labour on plots owned by the head’s non-nuclear relations than do members of the nuclear
family. Except in the case of the head’s private plots, the null hypotheses that any of the plot
ownership coefficients in columns (1) and (2) are equal is strongly rejected.
Turning to column (3), we find that the estimated plot ownership coefficients are close to zero
and statistically insignificant. In other words, there are no statistically significant differences in the
allocation of labour across private plots within nuclear family households once plot characteristics,
worker characteristics and household-crop-year fixed effects are controlled for.
These patterns are consistent with the theoretical predictions and provide strong evidence that
the allocation of labour across private plots are a function of family ties, and that levels of altruism
are higher for nuclear family ties than for non-nuclear relations within the same set of households.
Individual Labour Contributions on the Household’s Collective Plots
15Note that we do not control for the number of female and male workers on each plot, as implied by the theoretical
equations as these are potentially endogenous. To the extent that the number of workers can be proxied by household
demographic composition and familial ties, their effects will be subsumed in the household fixed-effects.
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In Table 10, we provide parallel estimates for the total labour contribution of each household
member to the household’s collective plots. Explanatory variables include the total size of the
individual’s private plots and of the household’s collective plots, demographic characteristics of the
household, and worker characteristics. In columns 1-3, we control for household fixed effects and
observable household characteristics such as the area of the collective plot and the demographic
composition of the household. In columns 4-6, we control for household-year fixed effects, which
allows us to account for time-varying household and village-level unobservables. In particular, we
account for annual variations in prices (crops, land and wages) that can influence labour supply
and land allocation. It is reassuring that the point estimates and the statistical significance are
stable across the two specifications.
The omitted relationship category is the ‘household head’. Focusing on columns 1-3, we see
that the estimated coefficient in all the other relationship categories is negative and statistically
significant. For a given relationship with the household head (e.g. a spouse, son or daughter)
the coefficient is more negative in the case of extended family households than for nuclear family
households. For example, the estimates imply that, within extended family households, the head’s
son contribute 37% less labour on the collective plots than the head himself (statistically significant
at the 1% level) while, in nuclear family households, there is no statistically significant difference
between their labour contributions. A test of the equality of the coefficients for nuclear family
members in columns 2 and 3 is strongly rejected.
The point estimates also indicate that the son contributes more labour than other male relations
and unrelated male individuals living within the same household, but the differences are small and
we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are equal. We are able to reject the hypothesis that the
daughter, other female relations and unrelated female individuals all contribute the same amount
of labour to the collective plots. We obtain similar patterns when we control for household-year
fixed effects in columns 4-6.
In summary, the estimates reveal sharp differences, between nuclear and extended family house-
holds, in the head’s spouse, son and daughter’s labour on the collective plots (taking the head’s own
labour as a reference point). On the other hand, the differences in labour contributions between
nuclear and extended family members within the same household is less marked. This pattern
suggests that individuals within nuclear family households – irrespective of their relation to the
household head – have preferences for household public goods more closely aligned with that of the
head than individuals within extended family households.
6 Intra-Household Risk-Sharing
As discussed in Section 3.1, in the absence of formal contracts, households where individuals have
‘stronger ties’ or higher levels of altruism among them should be more effective at sharing risk
among its members. It follows that if one exhibits a higher level of altruism towards a nuclear
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family member, as compared to a cohabiting extended-family member or unrelated individual, then
nuclear family households should serve as more effective risk-sharing units than extended family
households. In this section, we use data on farm income, rainfall shocks, consumption expenditures
and child anthropometric data to test this hypothesis in two different ways. Rainfall data is drawn
from the Climate Research Unit (CRU) at the University of East Anglia, which provides monthly
precipitation data on a 0.5×0.5 degree grid. We have geographic coordinates of each of the sample
villages. Hence, we are able to link each village to a CRU grid and the rainfall covering the period
from 1940 to 2012.
6.1 Efficiency in Consumption Expenditures
Rainfall shocks can have a differential impact on the output and income generated from different
farm plots owned by the same household, due to differences in skill of the plot managers, plot
characteristics, crops planted and inputs applied. Therefore, variations in rainfall can be used
to examine whether different income shocks – affecting the income from distinct plots – affects
household consumption differently. These comparisons can also provide the basis for testing for
efficient risk-sharing in consumption decisions within the household. Before proceeding to discuss
the empirical results, we briefly describe the methodology used to analyse consumption decisions.
The methodology is adapted from Duflo and Udry (2004), where a more general version of the
theory is developed and the intuition discussed in greater detail.
Following a common approach in the literature (e.g. Fafchamps, Udry and Czukas 1998,
Kazianga and Wahhaj 2013, Paxson 1992), we assume the following log-linear relationship between









γs + λh + λvt + ξht (16)
where yht represents total farm income for household h in period t, Xsht is a vector of physical
characteristics of plots of type s (private male, private female, or collective), Rvt is a vector of
rainfall measures in village v in period t, λh and λvt are, respectively household and village-year
fixed effects and ξht is an error term to capture other exogenous shocks that affect household farm
income in period t.16 The estimated coefficients from (16) are used to compute a linear combination
of rainfall variables as follows: yˆsht = (Xsht ⊗R
′
vt) γˆs. These fitted values represent the part of (the
log of) total farm income that is explained by the effect of rainfall variations on different categories
of farm plots owned by the household .
Ideally, we would use individual consumption data to test for consumption efficiency within
the household. But due to data limitations imposed by the agricultural household survey, we base
our efficiency tests on household consumption of different categories of food. Let us denote by
f ⊂ {1, 2, .., p} the subset of consumption goods which relate to food consumption.
16Note that measures of rainfall do not appear in the equation on their own as these effects are entirely subsumed
in the village-year fixed-effects.
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Then, if there is efficiency in household consumption expenditures, using (12) we can write








ytot, and expenditures on a
particular food category p ∈ f can be written as xp = κpxf where κp is a constant.
17 This last
equation implies a version of the test of consumption efficiency developed by Duflo and Udry (2004):
that different rainfall shocks affect consumption in food category p only via their effects on total
food consumption.
Note that the fitted values yˆjht described above are, in effect, linear combinations of different
measures of rainfall. They are suitable measures of household-specific rainfall shocks as they capture
the effects of rainfall on income from different categories of farm plots. Therefore, we can use them
to test the consumption efficiency hypothesis as follows. First, we estimate the effects of the rainfall








pipsyˆsht +Hhvtζp + λph + λpvt + νpht (18)
where xfht represents total food expenditures, and xpht represents expenditures in food category
p, in household h in period t. The vector Hhvt includes, potentially time-varying, household
characteristics including the demographic composition of the household. The terms λfh and λph
are household fixed-effects and λfvt and λpvt denote village-year fixed-effects. This specification
controls for village-level annual covariate shocks, and hence is frequently used in the village-level
risk sharing literature (e.g. Townsend 1994, Ravallion and Chaudhuri 1997, and Kazianga and






where s, s′ ∈ {c,m, f} (19)
Following Duflo and Udry (2004), we test for (19) using a non-linear Wald test, separately for
nuclear and extended family households.
6.1.1 Results
As explained in Section 4, we use information from the survey modules on plot harvest, livestock
and non-farming activities to construct measures of food consumption, broken down into three
categories: (i) cereals, (ii) pulses and vegetables, and (iii) other food items. The methodology
outlined above can be used to test for consumption efficiency within the household using these food
categories.
Table 11 shows the estimates of equation (16) using, as explanatory variations, the deviation of















ownership categories. In column (1), we use all ownership categories while in the other columns
we include only land allocated to (2) collective, (3) male private and (4) female private plots to
construct measures of alternative types of rainfall shocks. We also report on F-tests for the joint
significance of the estimated coefficients for all the interaction variables. The F-statistic is com-
fortably above 30 for the estimates in column (1) which suggests that the full set of the interaction
variables are suitable instruments to estimate the effects of total farm income on household con-
sumption.18 (As described below, the estimates in columns (2), (3) and (4) are used to construct
measures of rainfall shocks but not for 2SLS estimation).
The second-stage results are shown in Table 12. Columns (1)-(3) in Panel A provide the
estimated effects of shocks to household income on total food consumption for, respectively, all
households, nuclear family households and extended family households, based on the first-stage
estimation in Table 11, column (1). We do tests of over-identification for each sample and report
the Hansen J-statistics and p-values in the last two rows of Table 12, Panel A. The over-identification
restrictions are satisfied in each case19. The second-stage estimates indicate that a 10% change in
income induced by rainfall shocks leads to a 1.9% change in consumption in the full sample. For
nuclear and extended family households, the corresponding changes in consumption are 3.7% and
1.2%, respectively. A test of the equality of the two coefficients is rejected at the 1% level. Therefore,
it is apparent that food consumption in extended households is less exposed to idiosyncratic shocks
than food consumption in nuclear family households.
To implement the non-linear Wald test described in (19), we construct alternative measures of
rainfall shocks using the predicted values of log of household income based on the estimates in Table
11, columns 2-4. Each of these measures of rainfall shocks capture the effects of rainfall on income
via plots of a specific ownership category – collective, male private and female private. Columns
4-6 of Table 12, Panel A reports the estimated effects of these different measures of rainfall shocks
on total food consumption.20 The corresponding estimates for sub-categories of food consumption
– home-grown cereals, other home-grown produce, and purchased food – are shown in columns
(1)-(9), panel B. The χ2-statistics for the non-linear Wald tests are provided in Table 10. We are
able to reject consumption efficiency for the full sample of households at the 1% signifance level
and for the sample of extended-family households at the 7% significance level. However, we are not
able to reject consumption efficiency for the sample of nuclear family households.
6.2 Idiosyncratic Income Shocks and Child Anthropometrics
In this section, we provide direct evidence on whether co-resident household members share id-
iosyncratic income risk. Intuitively, household members who experience negative income draws
18In the Appendix Table A1, we reproduce the estimates shown in Table 11 for nuclear family and extended family
households separately and the results are broadly consistent with those shown in Table 11.
19Notice that in addition to crop income, our measure of income also includes livestock sales and non-farm income.
Taking into account income from the last two sources makes it less likely that rainfall could affect consumption
through other channels than income.
20Note that each coefficient in Table 12, Panel A, columns 4-6 corresponds to a different regression.
may benefit from transfers from co-resident individuals so that, on average, controlling for house-
hold aggregate shocks, individual consumption is insulated from own shocks. Ideally, implementing
such a test would require measures of individual level consumption or nutrition as used by Dercon
and Krishnan (2000) to test-risk sharing within households in Ethiopia. In this paper we use child-
level anthropometric outcomes, namely standardised child mid-upper-arm-circumference (MUAC).
During each round of the survey, all children below the age of 5 had their MUAC measured twice: in
July and in December, that correspond, respectively, to the peak of the lean season and the harvest
period. MUAC is a simple method of assessing nutritional status in children aged 6 to 60 months
recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) as an independent criterion for screening
young children for nutrition programming (Emergency Nutrition Network, 2012; Goossens et al.,
2012).
If households are efficiently sharing risk, then exogenous shocks to a mother’s income should not
influence nutritional outcomes for her children, once household-level aggregate shocks have been
controlled for. Based on this intuition, we estimate the following equation for the full sample of
households, and separately for nuclear and extended family households:
MUACijht = pimyˆjht +Xijhvtζm + λht + νijht
whereMUACijht is the z-score of the upper-arm circumference of child i with mother j in household
h in period t; yˆjht is a measure of j’s individual farm income or food consumption expenditures
as described below; the vector Xijhvt includes the characteristics of the child including, age and
gender; λht denotes household-year fixed-effects; and νijht is an error term. In the econometric
estimations, we use both the measures taken in July and in December, and control for the month
in which the measure was taken. Arguably, using both measures reduces measurement errors in
MUAC. We include the household-year fixed effects in order to control for household level shocks.
Note that, due to the inclusion of these fixed-effects, the sample can only include households which
have multiple mothers. In the case of nuclear family households, this translates into the sub-sample
of households where the head is polygynous. Perfect risk-sharing within the household would mean
that pim = 0.
We report the estimation results in Table 11. Columns 1-3 investigate the effects of exogenous
shocks to the mother’s crop income and columns 4-6 focus on the effects of mother food consumption
expenditures.21 Mother’s food consumption expenditures are measured as the sum of mother’s
harvest used in auto-consumption and food purchases by the mother - the purchases are financed
by crop sales and non-farm income. We use the mother’s plot characteristics interacted with local
rainfall deviations to instrument for the mother’s income and food consumption expenditures. The
F-statistics of excluded instruments shown in the penultimate row are all comfortably above the
21We use the mother’s crop income and food consumption expenditures for the current year rather than lagged
variables as MUAC is known to respond quickly to changes in nutrition (Goossens et al., 2012, 2013) and food
consumption patterns during a particular agricultural cycle may respond to rainfall realisations even before the
harvest in anticipation of changes in future income.
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10 with the exception of column 5. Therefore, it is unlikely that the results are driven by weak
instruments.
The results in columns 1-3 indicate that controlling for household level-shocks, shocks to the
mother’s income are passed through to child nutritional outcomes in the full sample (column 1)
and in extended family households (column 2), although the effects are relatively small. In nuclear
family households, however, the point estimate is virtually zero (column 3) implying that child
nutritional outcomes are unaffected by shocks to mother’s income once household-level shocks are
controlled for. We obtain a similar pattern in the rejection of intra-household insurance when
we use mother’s food expenditures in columns 4-6, except that the point estimates are larger:
the hypothesis of full insurance is rejected for the full sample and extended family households in
columns 1 and 2, but not for nuclear family households in columns 3.
Overall, the results suggest that nuclear family households are pooling risk but extended family
households are not with respect to the nutrition of children.
7 Robustness Checks
As noted in section 4, the characteristics of nuclear and extended-family households differ along a
number of dimensions which can affect the pattern of resource allocation within them. Extended-
family households, on average, have more members, the head is, on average, older and more likely to
be polygynous. It is plausible that the source of observed inefficiency of extended-family households
is not due to the nature of ties between the household members, per se, but due to their larger size,
or the practice of polygyny or the natural life-cycle of the household. To explore these hypotheses,
we replicate the basic test of efficiency in production and consumption, as described in sections 5
and 6, for subsets of the household sample which are identical or similar along these dimensions.
Specifically, we consider three subsamples: (i) the subset of monogamous households; (ii) a
subset of households for which the size distribution is nearly identical for nuclear and extended-
family households; (iii) a subset of households for which the distribution of the head’s age is
nearly identical for nuclear and extended-family households. For (ii) and (iii), we perform a logit
regression of the binary variable ’nuclear family household’ on household size and head’s age,
and then retain nuclear and extended family households with close predicted probabilities. In
the resulting subsample for (ii), average household size is 7.67 for extended family households
and 7.65 for nuclear family households and the two means are statistically indistinguishable. In
the resulting subsample for (iii), average household head age is 45.48 years for extended family
households and 45.60 years for nuclear family households and, again, the two means are statistically
indistinguishable. Arguably, any differences we detect between the nuclear and extended family
households within these subsamples are not due to differences in household size in (ii), or differences
in the age of the household head in (iii).
In Table 12, we report estimates of the basic plot yield equation in (13) for the subset of
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monogamous households (columns 1-3), the age-based subsample (columns 4-6) and the size-based
subsample (columns 7-9). We find that the estimated coefficients for male and female private
plots in nuclear and extended-family households are close to those obtained using the full sample
of households. In particular, the households achieve lower yields on private plots compared to
collective plots (the excluded plot category), and the yield gaps are higher for extended family
households than for nuclear family households. For each subsample, we can reject a null hypothesis
of equality in the female plot coefficients across nuclear and extended family households. Similarly,
we can reject the null hypothesis of equality of the corresponding male plot coefficients. Therefore,
we conclude that the wider dispersion of plot yields across extended family households cannot be
attributed to the extent of polygyny, household size or the household life-cycle as captured by the
age of the head.
To investigate the extent of consumption risk-sharing for these subsamples, we re-estimate
equations (16)-(18) and replicate the non-linear Wald test for equation (19) using each set of
estimates. The Wald statistic and p-values are reported in Table 13. The tests imply a rejection
of efficient risk-sharing for the subsamples based on household size and the head’s age at the 5%
significance level and for the monogamous subsample at the 10% signficance level. In each case,
we fail to reject consumption efficiency for the nuclear family households. We also fail to reject
efficiency for the extended family households for two out of the three subsamples but the Wald
statistics are consistently larger than in the case of nuclear family households. It is possible that
the failure to reject for the extended family households in these two cases is due to sample size
issues.
Although not conclusive, these patterns are broadly consistent with the results obtained for
the full sample of households. The rejection of consumption efficiency in the full sample does not
appear to be driven by polygyny given that rejection also occurs for the subsample of monogamous
households.22
8 Alternative Theories
Next, we consider whether alternative explanations of intra-household inefficiency in the literature
can explain our empirical results, in particular limited commitment (e.g. Ligon 2002; Mazzocco
2007), informational asymmetry (e.g. Ashraf 2009), preference heterogeneity (e.g. Foster and
Rosenzweig 2002), and moral hazard in teams (Guirkinger and Platteau 2015; Guirkinger et al.
2015), and how our proposed theory is related to them.
First, we note that lack of commitment is central to the theory we develop: the household
head (or any other plot owner) cannot, ex-ante, commit to rewarding other household members
22Akresh, Chen and Moore (2016) provide a potential explanation for why intra-household efficiency would differ
between monogamous and polygynous households. But their explanation implies that monogamous households
would be less efficient while our tests of consumption efficiency imply that, within the subsample of extended-family
households, they are more efficient.
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for their labour on farm plots. If it were possible to do so, the household could implement labour
contracts that lead to an efficient allocation of intra-household labour. With regard to information,
we assume only the visibility of plot incomes and whether proceeds from collective plots have been
used in accordance with social norms; in particular, the theory is consistent with the notion of
workers’ farm labour being imperfectly observed by plot owners.
Therefore, if we shut down altruism in the model – i.e. δij = δji = 0 – we obtain a household
characterised by lack of commitment and, potentially, informational asymmetry and preference
heterogeneity regarding household public goods. Then, we can still obtain differences in labour
intensity and plot yields between collective plots and private plots, with these gaps being more
favourable to the collective plot when household members exhibit stronger preference for the house-
hold public good. However, to reconcile the empirical results with these theoretical predictions in
the absence of altruism, we would have to assume that individuals in nuclear family households
have weaker preferences for the goods on which expenditures are made with the proceeds from the
collective plots. This seems unlikely given that non-nuclear households contain a more varied group
of individuals with, potentially, more diverse preferences regarding household expenditures.
Yield gaps between collective plots and private plots can also emerge due to moral hazard
in teams, as shown theoretically by Guirkinger and Platteau (2015) and empirically tested for
households in rural Mali by Guirkinger et al. (2015). However, this mechanism results in lower
yields on collective plots as compared to private plots while we obtain the opposite result for our
sample of nuclear and extended-family households in Burkina Faso.
Thus, we conclude that it is difficult to account for our empirical results on the basis of alterna-
tive theories of intra-household inefficiency where family ties play no role. An alternative theory of
intra-household allocation where family ties can play an important role is provided by Akresh, Chen
and Moore (2016). They postulate that resource allocation is based on a cooperative agreement
sustained by the threat of non-cooperation (by contrast, we postulate that the equilibrium alloca-
tion is a non-cooperative equilibrium). In this setting, the gains from cooperation are decreasing
in the level of altruism such that it is more difficult to sustain cooperation when intra-household
altruism is higher. In the context of our analysis, if nuclear family households have higher levels of
altruism than non-nuclear households, their theory would imply that extended-family households
are more efficient. However, we find the opposite is true in our empirical analysis.
9 The Advantages of Extended-Family Households
In sections 5-6.2, we provide evidence that nuclear family households allocate resources more ef-
ficiently than extended family households, and that, within the same household, there is higher
transfer of labour resources between individuals who share a nuclear family tie. Yet, more than
half the households in our sample of rural Burkinabe households are extended-family households.
Data from the Demographic and Health Surveys indicates that between one-quarter and three-
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quarter of households in West African countries, are extended-family households (Kazianga and
Wahhaj 2016). Given the advantages of nuclear family households, there is a need to explain why
we see such a high prevalence of extended family households across West Africa and, in particular,
in Burkina Faso.
We posit and present evidence on two broad explanations, both related to market failure. In
the context of Burkina Faso, the household head does not have the freedom to sell the farmland
that he inherits from the lineage. The presence of market failure in land rental and labour markets
prevents him from renting out this land or hiring in labour to work on it (see, for example, Udry
1996, and the references within). However, the institution of a household allows him to commit to
using the proceeds of the household collective plots on household public goods and, thus, incentivise
farm labour effort from any individual who joins the household, as well as remunerate these extra
working hands by awarding them individual farming plots to work on. A household head who starts
off with a large quantity of inherited land in relation to the size of his nuclear family will calculate
a higher marginal product of labour of an additional individual that he can persuade to join the
household23. Therefore, controlling for the size of the nuclear family, a household head with a large
quantity of inherited land should have a higher net benefit from – and therefore be more likely to
have – extended-family members or unrelated individuals living within his household.
To test this hypothesis, we estimate linear probability models where the dependent variable is
the household structure (1 = nuclear, 0 = extended), and include the head’s inherited land, and
the demographic composition of his nuclear family as explanatory variables. The results are shown
in Table 17. We also control for the household’s other farmland (columns 1-3) or the household’s
total land per capita (columns 4-6). In columns 6-9, we include the squared term of inherited
land to check for non-linearity in the hypothesized relationship. The specifications also include
year dummies (columns 1, 4 and 7), year dummies and village fixed-effects (columns 2,5 and 8), or
village-year fixed-effects (columns 3,6 and 9). In each estimation, the probability of an extended-
family household is increasing in the size of the head’s inherited land (statistically significant at
the 1% level), as implied by the hypothesis described above.
Our second explanation relates to financial market failure. The income volatility of agricultural
households in developing countries, the challenges they face in obtaining credit and insurance
from the market for the purpose of consumption smoothing, and the limited nature of informal
insurance within villages have been well documented in the literature (e.g. Townsend, 1994; Dercon
2002; Kazianga and Udry, 2006). In this context, increasing the size of the household by having
non-nuclear members join it can help the household to diversify its income sources and therefore
improve consumption smoothing. The estimates in Table 13 – discussed in Section 6.1.1 – shows
that household food consumption is more sensitive to shocks to agricultural income in the case of
23It is important to note that the head’s nuclear family size is also endogenous since this is determined by marriage
decisions (monogamy versus polygyny) and fertility choice. However, these choices can only provide a long-term
solution to the household’s farm labour shortages. By contrast, the household’s available labour can be adjusted
relatively quickly by having extended-family members or unrelated individuals join or leave the household.
29
nuclear family households than in the case of extended family households, point estimate of 0.334
versus 0.158, and statistically different at the 5% level.
We provide an indirect test of this hypothesis relating to financial market failure using historical
rainfall data to create a measure of a household’s income volatility. Specifically, we use the estimated
coefficients from the first-stage regressions in Table 11, information on the characteristics of the
head’s inherited land, and data on historical rainfall to calculate the household’s predicted income
shocks during the 20 year period prior to the survey. We take the variance of these income shocks
to construct a measure of each household head’s income volatility when he first inherited his land
as a function of the farmland characteristics and local rainfall conditions. The hypothesis related to
financial market failure would imply that household heads facing greater income volatility should be
more likely to have extended-family members or unrelated individuals living within his household.
In Table 18, we present estimates of linear probability models of household structure similar to
those in Table 16 but include the head’s income volatility as an explanatory variable. Consistent
with our reasoning, increased volatility increases the probability of an extended-family household,
the relevant coefficient being statistically significant at the 1% level for each specification. In
other words, household heads exposed to greater income volatility due to the characteristics of
their inherited land and local rainfall conditions were more likely to end up with extended-family
households.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated and compared how resources are allocated within nuclear and
extended-family households in rural Burkina Faso. We found that nuclear family households are
close to being efficient in household production, and could not reject the hypothesis that they
engaged in efficient intra-household risk-sharing in consumption choices. By contrast, extended
family households were found to be inefficient in both production and consumption choices.
We argued that these differences were due to the stronger familial ties that exist within the
nuclear family. In support of this hypothesis we showed that labour contributions by household
members on individually managed plots were significantly higher when the owner and worker shared
a nuclear family tie, as compared to the situation where they shared an extended family tie or were
unrelated.
These results are significant for the wider literature on intra-household allocation and household
composition. First, we identify within the same geographic, economic and social environments
two sets of households, one which achieves near Pareto efficiency in production and consumption
decisions and another which does not. We developed a theory of intra-household allocation where
we explicitly account for familial ties and account for both efficient and inefficient production
and consumption choices. The empirical evidence, combined with the theory, provides a way of
reconciling two strands of empirical evidence in the literature that have either failed to reject or
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have rejected Pareto efficient allocation of household resources.
It is important to recognise that the composition of a household – in particular, whether it
consists of a nuclear family unit or includes extended family members and unrelated individuals –
is endogenous to the migration decisions of its members. Therefore, differences in intra-household
allocation between nuclear and extended-family households may be due, at least in part, to selection
effects. In our analysis we do not isolate or rule out this potential source of variation.
Nevertheless, the evidence on the more efficient nature of nuclear family households raises the
question why extended family households exist at all. We presented two hypotheses related to (i)
land and labour market failure and (ii) insurance market failure, and presented evidence consistent
with these explanations. The implication is that the development of these markets in similar rural
settings, combined with increasing land scarcity, will cause extended family households to give way
to nuclear family households. In the context of small-holder agricultural households, the analysis
suggests that the evolution of household composition from extended to nuclear family households
will lead to more efficient allocation of productive resources within the household because of the
ties that bind together members of the nuclear family.
11 Theoretical Appendix
Deriving Conditions for Labour Allocation: From the optimisation problem in (5) for a male
household member i, and the demand equations in section (3.1), we obtain the following first-order
conditions:
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Using the functional forms for production and utility, we can write
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R. For ease of notation, we let A˜j =
{R (qj , r)}
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Taking logs and multiplying throughout by −1, we obtain








− ρα ln A˜c + [1− ρ (β1 + β2)] lnLmc (24)




+ [1− ρ (β1 + β2)] lnLmi (25)




+ [1− ρ (β1 + β2)] lnLmj (26)
Therefore, using (24) and (25), we obtain
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Using (α+ β1 + β2) = 1, we obtain the equations shown in (10) and (11).




























































































































, Γ′ = 1 + ρ[1−ρ(β1+β2)] .










































Using (α+ β1 + β2) = 1, we obtain the equations shown in (8) and (9).
Individual Labour Contributions on Plots: Let us denote by µij the fraction of total
labour on plot j provided by worker i; µij is likely to depend on i’s own characteristics that shape,







µ (wi) where nm (j) is the total number of male workers on plot j and wi
is a vector of individual characteristics of worker i. If µi = µ (wi) = 1, then work would be divided
equally between workers on each plot. Thus, µi is the extent to which i’s labour share on his own
plot deviates from equal shares, and µ (wi) represents the additional deviation on plots owned by
others as a function of i’s own characteristics.
Suppose that for individuals belonging to the same nuclear family, we have δji = δij = δn > 0
and δe is the corresponding parameter for individuals belonging to different nuclear families such
24In game-theoretic terms, µij depends on the equilibrium obtained in the subgame where household members
make their labour allocations across plots.
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that 1 > δn > δe > 0.
25 Suppose that i and j share a nuclear family tie while j′ is a cohabitating
individual who belongs to a different nuclear family. If i contributes positive amounts of labour on
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Following the same reasoning, we can derive parallel equations for individual female labour
contributions across private plots. Equations (36) and (37) provide a link between i’s (male)
labour contribution on his private plot, the private plot of another household member, and the
nature of the family tie between them. For example, if the private plots of i and j are identical
(i.e. Ai = Aj), their preferences are perfectly aligned (δn = δji = δij = 1) and equal numbers of
men work on their respective plots (nm (i) = nm (j)), then i will work equal amounts of time on
the two plots. If δn is below 1, he will spend relatively more time on his own plot. More generally,
the equations imply that, controlling for plot and individual characteristics and number of workers
on the respective plots, i contributes more labour per unit area on the private plot of a nuclear
family member than that of an extended family member (or an unrelated individual living within
the same household). We test this hypothesis using data on individual labour contributions on
farm plots in Section 5.3.
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Figure 1: Plot yield dispersions
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Tables  
Table 1: Household Composition and Plot Characteristics of Extended and Nuclear Family Households  
 




Households Difference t-stat 
    mean (sd) mean (sd)     
Household Head's Characteristics       
 Gender (1 = Male, 0 = Female) 0.95 (0.22) 0.94 (0.24) 0.01 2.03 
 Age 50.75 (15.88) 48.79 (13.43) 1.96 7.84 
 Married? ( 1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.92 (0.27) 0.93 (0.26) -0.01 -1.88 
 # of Wives 1.57 (1.13) 1.47 (0.98) 0.10 5.56 
 Literate? ( 1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.26 (0.44) 0.23 (0.42) 0.02 2.93         
Household Size 11.78 (6.70) 7.30 (3.86) 4.48 49.60 
# Married Men 1.76 (1.12) 1.04 (0.48) 0.72 51.79 
# Extended Family Members 4.59 (5.00) - - 4.59 82.56 
        
# Observations 8080   5723       
        
Household Plot Characteristics       
 Total Plot Area (hectares) 7.14 (7.48) 4.50 (4.48) 2.65 25.90 
 Proportion of Collective Plot 0.74 (0.30) 0.75 (0.33) 0.00 -0.55 
 # of Plots 7.54 (5.00) 5.64 (3.55) 1.90 26.11 
 # of Collective Plots 4.29 (2.95) 3.52 (2.49) 0.76 16.39 
 # of Private Plots 3.17 (3.76) 2.06 (2.45) 1.11 21.07 
 # of Male Private Plots 2.39 (3.14) 1.62 (2.13) 0.77 17.17         
# Observations 7516   5220       
Source: Authors calculations using data from the Ministry of Agriculture of Burkina Faso. 
Notes: Nuclear family households are defined as households consisting of the head, his spouse or spouses, and their 
children. Households ǁith oŶe oƌ ŵoƌe iŶdiǀiduals ǁho do Ŷot ďeloŶg to the head’s ŶuĐleaƌ faŵily aƌe Đlassified as 
extended family households. Total area is the sum of the area of all plots farmed by the household in a given year. 
Collective plots refer to plots managed by the household head (or, occasionally, by another household member), the 
proceeds of which are shared among all household members. Private plots refer to plot managed by individual 




Table 2: Labour, Land Allocation, and Farm Productivity within Extended and Nuclear Family Households 
 
 
Private plots Collective plots managed by: 
Share allocated to 
Collective Plots: 








All households       
Male Labour (days) 20.39 16.39 169.65 6.10 0.80 0.83 
Female Labour (days) 11.39 55.29 137.24 6.18 0.65 0.68 
Total Labour (days) 31.96 71.95 307.44 12.34 0.73 0.75 
Area (ha) 0.50 0.87 4.21 0.16 0.73 0.76 
Farming intensity (days/ha) 64.15 82.96 72.99 76.66   
Yield (CFA/ha)  88674.89 79641.86 89073.29 86037.14   
Nuclear households       
Male Labour (days) 13.90 13.70 139.05 2.46 0.82 0.84 
Female Labour (days) 7.28 44.07 112.41 3.09 0.67 0.69 
Total Labour (days) 21.22 57.86 251.92 5.64 0.75 0.77 
Area (ha) 0.32 0.64 3.31 0.07 0.76 0.78 
Farming intensity (days/ha) 66.93 90.53 76.15 84.00   
Yield (CFA/ha)  95487.73 85059.06 88304.52 81561.08   
Shadow Price of Land 446.30 180.73    
 
Extended households       
Male Labour (days) 24.89 18.25 190.90 8.63 0.79 0.82 
Female Labour (days) 14.24 63.09 154.48 8.33 0.64 0.68 
Total Labour (days) 39.43 81.74 346.00 17.00 0.71 0.75 
Area (ha) 0.62 1.03 4.84 0.23 0.72 0.75 
Farming intensity (days/ha) 63.17 79.69 71.49 75.15   
Yield (CFA/ha)  86270.92 77297.68 89438.24 86959.95     
Shadow Price of Land 319.70 158.71     
Source: Authoƌs’ ĐalĐulatioŶs usiŶg data fƌoŵ the MiŶistƌy of AgƌiĐultuƌe of BuƌkiŶa Faso. 
Notes: Nuclear family households are defined as households consisting of the head, his spouse or spouses, and their 
children. Households with one or more individuals who do Ŷot ďeloŶg to the head’s ŶuĐleaƌ faŵily aƌe Đlassified as 
extended family households. Total area is the sum of the area of all plots farmed by the household in a given year. 
Collective plots refer to plots managed by the household head (or, occasionally, by another household member), the 
proceeds of which are shared among all household members. Private plots refer to plot managed by individual 
household members who then make decisions on how to allocate the proceeds. Yield is measured as the value of 
harvest divided by the size of the plot. The shadow price of land is measured as total labour allocated to collective 
plots (in ͞peƌsoŶ-days͟) divided by the size of private plots in hectares. 
 
  
Table 3: Estimates of Plot Yields for Extended and Nuclear Family Households 
 
  Dep. Var.: ln(Plot Yield in Value/Hectare) 
VARIABLES All H’holds Extended Nuclear 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Plot TǇpe: ;͚collectiǀe plots͛ eǆcludedͿ       
    Male Private Plot -0.24*** -0.27*** -0.14*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
    Female Private Plot -0.48*** -0.54*** -0.33*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
TopographǇ: ;͚flat ground͛ eǆcludedͿ    
    Low Ground -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
    Sloping Ground 0.01 -0.01 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) 
Plot Location: ;͚cases͛ eǆcludedͿ    
    Brousse 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
    Campement 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.11 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) 
Plot Owner Age 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age Squared -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 12.42*** 12.52*** 12.05*** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) 
    
Observations 81,485 53,366 28,119 
R-squared 0.37 0.37 0.37 
# H’hold-Crop-Year Groups 49,750 30,813 18,937 
F-Stat. test: Male Plot = Female Plot = 0 256.9 244.8 53.25 
p value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source: Authors calculations using data from the Ministry of Agriculture of Burkina Faso. 
Notes: *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent 
level. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level. The dependent variable is natural log of plot yield 
measured in the local currency per hectare. The regressions control for household-crop-year fixed effects. Dummy 
variables representing the plot manager education level and dummy variables representing plot size by deciles are 
included in the regressions but not shown.  
 
  
Table 4: Estimates of Plot Yields for Different Plot Ownership Categories within Extended and Nuclear 
Family Households.  
 
  Dep. Variable: ln(Plot Yield in Value/Hectare) 
VARIABLES All H’holds Extended Nuclear 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Plot TǇpe: ;head͛s ͚collectiǀe plots͛ eǆcludedͿ  
  Other Collective Plots -0.27*** -0.25*** -0.41*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) 
  Head’s Pƌiǀate Plots -0.18*** -0.21*** -0.10 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
  Spouse’s Pƌiǀate Plots -0.52*** -0.58*** -0.39*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
  Son’s Pƌiǀate Plots -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.32*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) 
  Daughter’s Pƌiǀate Plots -0.56*** -0.59*** -0.47*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) 
  Other Male Relatives -0.33*** -0.35***  
 
(0.04) (0.04)  
  Other Female Relatives -0.50*** -0.53***  
 
(0.03) (0.03)  
  Unrelated Males -0.38*** -0.42***  
 
(0.14) (0.14)  
  Unrelated Females -0.55*** -0.59***  
 
(0.03) (0.03)  
    
Observations 81,485 53,366 28,119 
R-squared 0.37 0.37 0.38 
# H’hold-Crop-Year Groups 49,750 30,813 18,937 
F-Stat. test: son = other male 0.29 0.15  
p value 0.75 0.86  
F-Stat. test: daughter = other female 1.42 1.54  
p value 0.24 0.22  
F-Stat. test: all nuclear private & other 
collective equal 23.95 30.33 1.71 
p value 0.00 0.00 0.16 
F-Stat. test: all other plots equal 13.74 16.60  
p value 0.00 0.00   
Source: Authors calculations using data from the Ministry of Agriculture of Burkina Faso. 
Notes: *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent 
level. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level. The dependent variables are the natural log of plot yield 
measured in the local currency per hectare. The regressions include household-crop-year fixed effects, the plot 
ŵaŶageƌ’s eduĐatioŶ leǀel aŶd age, ĐategoƌiĐal ǀaƌiaďles representing plot size by deciles and plot characteristics 
and a constant term (not shown).  
Table 5: Labour Use Intensity across Plot Ownership Categories within Nuclear and Extended Family Households 
 
Dep. Variable: 
lŶ;laďouƌ/heĐtuƌeͿ fƌoŵ …  
Nuclear households Extended households 
Men Women Children All h’hold Men Women Children All h’hold 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Plot TǇpe: ;head͛s ͚collectiǀe plots͛ eǆcludedͿ               
  Other Collecive Plots -1.11*** -0.12 -0.00 -0.43*** -0.87*** -0.15* -0.01 -0.34*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.00) (0.07) (0.12) (0.09) (0.01) (0.04) 
  Head’s Pƌiǀate Plots -0.09 -0.93*** 0.01 -0.27*** -0.43*** -0.73*** 0.00 -0.44*** 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.00) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.00) (0.04) 
  “pouse’s Pƌiǀate Plots -1.99*** 0.15** -0.00* -0.53*** -2.22*** 0.03 -0.00 -0.71*** 
 (0.10) (0.07) (0.00) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.00) (0.02) 
  “oŶ’s Pƌiǀate Plots 0.65*** -2.20*** 0.00 -0.50*** -0.26*** -1.32*** -0.00 -0.57*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.00) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.00) (0.03) 
  Daughteƌ’s Pƌiǀate Plots -1.50*** 0.05 -0.00 -0.43*** -2.20*** 0.12 -0.00 -0.65*** 
 (0.24) (0.15) (0.00) (0.08) (0.15) (0.10) (0.00) (0.05) 
  Other Male Relatives     -0.40*** -1.34*** -0.01* -0.58*** 
     (0.08) (0.11) (0.01) (0.04) 
  Other Female Relatives     -2.33*** 0.16** -0.00 -0.68*** 
     (0.10) (0.08) (0.00) (0.03) 
  Unrelated Males     -0.62* -1.59*** -0.04 -0.74*** 
     (0.33) (0.48) (0.04) (0.09) 
  Unrelated Female     -2.22*** 0.01 0.00 -0.72*** 
     (0.11) (0.07) (0.00) (0.03) 
         
Observations 28,119 28,119 28,119 28,119 53,366 53,366 53,366 53,366 
R-squared 0.41 0.44 0.01 0.76 0.36 0.41 0.01 0.74 
F-Stat. test-1  98.99 71.79 0.94 1.45 140.10 60.98 1.20 27.13 
p value 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.23 0.19 0.00 0.31 0.00 
F-Stat. test son = other male   1.65 0.16 1.07 1.92 
p value     0.53 0.86 0.40 0.15 
F-Stat. test daughter = other female   0.63 3.88 0.98 1.71 
p value     0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 
F-Stat. test all other plots equal   77.74 37.31 1.05 13.57 
p value         0.00 0.02 0.34 0.18 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Ministry of Agriculture of Burkina Faso. 
Notes: *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
village level. The dependent variables are the natural log of male, female, child and total household labour. All regressions include household-crop-year fixed 
effects, and controls for household demographic composition, age of the household head, plot characteristics and a constant term (not shown). F-Stat. test-1 is 
short for an F-test that the coefficients for nuclear family private plots and other collective plots are all equal. 
Table 6: Household Meŵďeƌs’ Individual Laďouƌ CoŶtƌiďutioŶs oŶ Household’s Pƌiǀate Plots 








 (1) (2) (3) 
Plot Owner͛s ‘elationship to Head: ;ǁorker͛s oǁn plots eǆcludedͿ  
  Head -0.56*** -0.52*** 0.08 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
  Spouse -0.75*** -0.44*** 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
  Son -0.57*** -0.35*** 0.07 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) 
  Daughter -0.71*** -0.43***  
 
(0.09) (0.06)  
  Other Male Relatives -0.17*** -0.78***  
 
(0.03) (0.00)  
  Unrelated Males -0.26** -0.97***  
 
(0.12) (0.17)  
  Other Female Relatives -0.27*** -0.79***  
 
(0.02) (0.06)  
  Unrelated Females -0.27*** -0.92***  
 
(0.04) (0.06)  
Worker is Female 0.24*** 0.31*** 0.28*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Worker Age 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Worker Age Squared -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Woƌkeƌ’s Education -0.01* -0.01** -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    
Constant 5.20*** 4.86*** 5.29*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Observations 25,237 48,087 30,026 
R-squared 0.37 0.34 0.33 
# H’hold-Crop-Year Groups 8,729 12,124 8,147 
Worker’s RelatioŶ to Head extended member nuclear member nuclear member 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using data from the Ministry of Agriculture of Burkina Faso. 
Notes: *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the village level. The dependent variable is natural log of a paƌtiĐulaƌ household ŵeŵďeƌ’s ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ 
per hectare on a specific private plot. Columns 1 and 2 show the estimates for extended-family households. Column 3 show the 
estimates for nuclear family households. Each estimation includes controls for household-crop-year fixed-effects, plot size, location 
and topography (not shown). 
 
  
Table 7: Household Members’ Laďouƌ CoŶtƌiďutioŶ oŶ Households’ Collective Plots 
 
 Dependent Variable: Ln(Labour/Hectare) 
 All H’holds Extended Nuclear All H’holds Extended Nuclear 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Worker͛s ‘elationship to Head ;head is eǆcludedͿ 
  Spouse -0.81*** -0.88*** -0.56*** -0.92*** -0.94*** -0.66*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) 
  Son -0.42*** -0.45*** -0.07 -0.47*** -0.47*** -0.08 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.18) (0.08) (0.10) (0.15) 
  Daughter -1.61*** -1.76*** -0.98*** -1.62*** -1.78*** -0.96*** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.21) (0.11) (0.13) (0.19) 
  Other Male Relatives  -0.54*** -0.61***  -0.57*** -0.61***  
 (0.10) (0.10)  (0.10) (0.10)  
  Other Female Relatives -2.20*** -2.24***  -2.30*** -2.31***  
 (0.13) (0.13)  (0.12) (0.13)  
  Unrelated Males -0.56** -0.61**  -0.80*** -0.85***  
 (0.28) (0.29)  (0.25) (0.25)  
  Unrelated Females -1.40*** -1.49***  -1.40*** -1.46***  
 (0.14) (0.14)  (0.13) (0.14)  
Constant 3.68*** 4.73*** 1.33 3.11*** 3.20*** 2.57*** 
 (0.62) (0.74) (1.01) (0.16) (0.19) (0.31) 
Observations 55,628 39,242 16,386 55,628 39,242 16,386 
R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.03 
Fixed Effects H’hold H’hold H’hold H’hold-Year H’hold-Year H’hold-Year 
F-Stat. test1 0.95 1.57  1.42 2.10  
p value 0.39 0.21  0.00 0.12  
F-Stat. test2 21.17 18.35  30.69 25.05  
p value 0.00 0.00  0.24 0.00  
F-Stat. test3 83.81 72.04 27.01 87.16 77.15 29.22 
p value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source:  Authors calculations using data from the Ministry of Agriculture of Burkina Faso. 
Notes: *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the village level. 
The dependent variable is natural log of each household member contribution on collective plots. Columns 1 and 4 show the estimates 
for the pooled sample. Columns 2 and 5 show the estimates for extended family households, and columns 4 and 6 show the estimates 
for nuclear family households. Columns 1-3 control for household fixed effects, and columns 4-6 control for household-year fixed 
effects. All regressions control for ǁoƌkeƌ’s age aŶd age sƋuaƌed, eduĐatioŶ leǀel aŶd the iŶdiǀidual’s pƌiǀate plot size ;Ŷot shoǁŶͿ. IŶ 
addition, columns 1-3 include the size of the collective plot, household size and composition and time trend (not shown). F-Stat. test1 
is short for an F-test that the coefficients on son and other males are equal. F-Stat. test2 is short for an F-test that the coefficients on 
daughter and other females are equal. F-Stat. test3 is short for an F-test that the coefficients on all nuclear members (spouse, son, 






 Table 8: Effects of Rainfall on Household Income 
 
 Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Household Income 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rainfall deviation from long run average interacted with farm area of type: 
low ground-collective plots 0.053** 0.069**   
 
(0.025) (0.027)   
sloping ground-collective plots 0.005 0.008   
 
(0.016) (0.016)   
location "brousse"-collective plots 0.159*** 0.152***   
 
(0.011) (0.010)   
location "campement"-collective plots 0.123*** 0.120***   
 
(0.020) (0.021)   
low ground-male plots 0.044  0.091*  
 
(0.063)  (0.049)  
sloping ground-male plots 0.113**  0.078  
 
(0.056)  (0.058)  
location "brousse"-male plots 0.150***  0.112***  
 
(0.020)  (0.025)  
location "campement"-male plots 0.038  -0.009  
 
(0.027)  (0.031)  
low ground-female plots 0.163**   0.124* 
 (0.074)   (0.067) 
sloping ground-female plots 0.146*   0.122 
 (0.086)   (0.091) 
location "brousse"-female plots 0.152***   0.237*** 
 (0.028)   (0.028) 
location "campement"-female plots 0.226***   0.268*** 
 (0.080)   (0.079) 
     
Observations 12,958 12,958 12,958 12,958 
F-Stat. test excluded instruments 31.16 61.10 7.60 28.12 
p value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source:  Authors calculations using data from the Ministry of Agriculture of Burkina Faso. 
Notes: *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the village level. The dependent variable is the natural log of household’s total income.  In column 1, the 
instruments consist of rainfall deviation interacted with the characteristics of all household plots. In columns 2-4, the instruments 
consist of rainfall deviation interacted with the characteristics of collective plots, the characteristics of male private plots, and the 
characteristics of female private plots, respectively. The regressions control for household fixed effects and village-year-fixed effects. 
Other covariates (not shown) are household demographic characteristics, age and gender of the household head. We report F-
statistics for the excluded instruments in each column.    
Table 9: Household Consumption Responses to Income Shocks 
Panel A: Effects of Plot Specific Income Shocks on Household Total Food Consumption 
 Dependent Variable: Log of Total Food Consumption 
 All H’holds Nuclear Extended All H’holds Nuclear Extended 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
log total income-all plots IV 0.227*** 0.414*** 0.178***    
 
(0.045) (0.128) (0.067)    
log total income-collective plots IV    0.223*** 0.582*** 0.097 
    (0.053) (0.160) (0.072) 
log total income-male private plots IV    0.452*** 1.313** 0.179 
    (0.166) (0.518) (0.210) 
log total income-female private plots IV    0.158 -0.042 0.337** 
       
Chi-sq (1)   8.01    
Chi-sq (1) p-val   0.00    
F-Stat.     1.04 2.94 1.11 
p value    0.35 0.05 0.33 
Hansen J-stat 3.197 0.771 2.309    
Chi-sq (3) p-val 0.362 0.856 0.511    
Wald statistic    17.60 4.10 11.80 
p value    0.01 0.66 0.07 
 
Panel B: Effects of Plot Specific Income Shocks on Different Categories of Household Food Consumption 











 All H’holds Nuclear Extended All H’holds Nuclear Extended All H’holds Nuclear Extended 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
log total income-collective plots IV 0.290*** 0.696*** 0.189* 0.661*** 0.844 0.446* 0.289 0.645 0.318 
 (0.087) (0.233) (0.108) (0.190) (0.651) (0.257) (0.262) (1.073) (0.341) 
log total income-male private plots IV 0.539* 0.743 0.075 1.628*** 2.760** 0.663 0.788 3.809* 1.471 
 (0.285) (0.555) (0.337) (0.511) (1.395) (0.711) (0.670) (2.201) (0.994) 
log total income-female private plots IV 0.031 -0.695 0.193 0.510 0.125 0.605 0.884* 1.707 0.396 
 (0.236) (1.011) (0.222) (0.321) (1.202) (0.491) (0.497) (1.394) (0.724) 
          
Source:  Authors calculations using data from the Ministry of Agriculture of Burkina Faso. 
Notes: *** p<=0.01, ** p<=0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level. The regressions control household fixed-effects and village-year fixed-effects. 
Other covariates are household demographic characteristics, age and gender of the household head. Table 11 column (1) is the first stage of columns 1-3 of Panel A. Columns 2-4 
of Table 11 are used as first stage in columns 4-6 of panel A and in Panel B.  In Panel A, in column 3, we report a chi-square test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of 
nuclear and extended family households are equal. In columns 4-6, we report the F-Statistic of the null hypothesis that all the estimated coefficients in the same column are equal. 
Hansen-J statistic of the over-identification test is reported in panel A, columns 1-3.   The Wald statistics provided in Panel A, columns 4-6   are based on the test of consumption 
efficiency using equation (19).
Table 10: Test of Intra-household Risk-Sharing based on Child Anthropometric Data 
 
  Dependent Variable: Z-Score of Child Mid-Upper-Arm Circumference 
 All H’holds Nuclear Extended All H’holds Nuclear Extended 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
log of mother’s crop income 0.009* 0.002 0.013***    
  
(0.005) (0.013) (0.005)    
log of mother’s cons. expend.    0.019* 0.010 0.028*** 
    (0.011) (0.030) (0.011) 
child is female 0.072*** 0.115*** 0.057*** 0.072*** 0.115*** 0.057*** 
 (0.015) (0.028) (0.018) (0.015) (0.028) (0.018) 
       
Observations 38,777 12,037 25,902 38,777 12,037 25,902 
R-squared 0.048 0.035 0.055 0.046 0.034 0.049 
Source: Authors calculations using data from the Ministry of Agriculture of Burkina Faso. 
Notes: *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level. 
The dependent variable is standardized (z-score) child mid-upper-arm-circumference (MUAC). The regressions control for household-year fixed effects, child age dummies and 





Table 11: Estimates of Yields for Extended and Nuclear Family Households with Homogenous Sub-Samples 
 
  Dependent Variable: Ln(Plot Yield in Value/Hectare) 
 All H’holds Extended Nuclear All H’holds Extended Nuclear All H’holds Extended Nuclear 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Plot TǇpe: ;͚collectiǀe plots͛ eǆcludedͿ                
Male Private -0.24*** -0.27*** -0.10 -0.24*** -0.26*** -0.18*** -0.22*** -0.27*** -0.15*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Female Private -0.42*** -0.47*** -0.29*** -0.47*** -0.53*** -0.36*** -0.41*** -0.47*** -0.34*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Plot Owner Age 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age Squared -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 12.31*** 12.36*** 12.12*** 12.34*** 12.47*** 11.95*** 12.29*** 12.46*** 12.11*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.23) (0.07) (0.08) (0.15) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) 
          
Observations 35,873 22,344 13,529 68,293 43,260 25,033 47,835 20,380 27,455 
R-squared 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.38 
specification robust to monogamy monogamy monogamy head age head age head age h’hold size h’hold size h’hold size 
F-St. test Male_Plot = Female_Plot = 0 96.56 82.95 18.08 225.8 220.6 49.07 122.1 79.11 55.70 
p value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source: Authors calculations using data from the Ministry of Agriculture of Burkina Faso. 
Notes: *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level. 
The dependent variable is natural log of plot yield measured in the local currency per hectare. Columns 1-3 show estimates for monogamous household heads. In columns 4-6, 
age of household head is the same on average for nuclear and extended family households. In columns 7-9, nuclear and extended family household have the same size on 
average. Columns 1, 4 and 7 include all households. Columns 2, 5, and 8 include extended family households. Columns 3, 6 and 9 include nuclear family households. The 
regressions control for household-crop-year fixed effects. Dummy variables representing the plot manager education level and dummy variables representing plot size by 





Table 12: Tests for Consumption Efficiency using Homogenous Subsamples 
 
  Monogamous Households Similar Size Households Similar Head Age Households 
 
All Nuclear Extended All Nuclear Extended All Nuclear Extended 
Test of Consumption Efficiency 
       
Wald statistic 11.51 1.80 7.34 13.18 2.71 17.60 14.86 5.64 9.15 
prob 0.07 0.94 0.29 0.04 0.84 0.01 0.02 0.46 0.17 
Source:  Authors calculations using data from the Ministry of Agriculture of Burkina Faso. 
Notes: The tests use the coefficients on regressions similar to those reported in Table 13, but estimated for each subsample. 




Table 13: Land Inherited by Household Head and Household Structure 
Source: Authors calculations using data from the Ministry of Agriculture of Burkina Faso. 
Notes: *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level. The 
dependent variable is one for nuclear family households and zero for extended family households.  The regressions also control for household demographic characteristics (based on the 
nuclear family members) and head age and gender. Columns 1-2, 4-5, 7-8 and 10-11 also control for village level prices.
  Binary Dependent Variable: (Nuclear Family Household = 1) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
                            
land inherited by head -0.024*** 
-
0.024*** -0.024*** -0.038*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.043*** -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.023*** -0.039*** -0.021*** -0.040*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Inherited land squared       0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***  0.001***  0.001*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
other h’hold farm land -0.035*** 
-
0.037*** -0.039***    -0.037*** -0.040*** -0.042***     
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)    (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)     
land per capita    0.286*** 0.272*** 0.279***        
    
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025)        
head is female -0.010*** 
-
0.009*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
year 2011 0.037*** 0.040***  0.057*** 0.060***  0.029*** 0.031***  0.049*** 0.046***   
 
(0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010)   
year 2012 0.024* 0.011  0.041*** 0.032**  0.019 0.004  0.033** 0.017   
 
(0.014) (0.014)  (0.014) (0.013)  (0.014) (0.014)  (0.014) (0.014)   
              
Constant 0.522*** 0.318** 0.552*** 0.176 0.180 0.446*** 0.679*** 0.398*** 0.593*** 0.403*** 0.333** 0.526*** 0.559*** 
 (0.138) (0.142) (0.012) (0.134) (0.142) (0.012) (0.135) (0.140) (0.011) (0.137) (0.141) (0.010) (0.010) 
              
Observations 13,176 13,176 13,176 13,176 13,176 13,176 13,176 13,176 13,176 13,176 13,176 13,176 13,176 
R-squared 0.086 0.067 0.066 0.089 0.067 0.066 0.097 0.080 0.079 0.069 0.059 0.048 0.058 
Village fixed effects No yes yes No yes yes No yes yes No yes yes yes 
Village-year fixed effects No no yes No no yes No no yes No no yes yes 
 Table 14: Variance of Long-run Income Shocks and Household Structure   
  Binary Dependent Variable: (Nuclear Family Household = 1) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
variance of income shocks -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.115*** -0.116*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) 
current rainfall deviation     0.010 0.010 
     (0.007) (0.007) 
head is female -0.056** -0.054* -0.056** -0.055* -0.056** -0.056** 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) 
year 2011 0.059***  0.059***  0.070*** 0.070*** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.012) (0.012) 
year 2012 0.028**  0.028**  0.022 0.021 
 (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015) (0.015) 
Constant 0.259* 0.510*** 0.259* 0.509*** 0.158 0.157 
 (0.153) (0.011) (0.153) (0.011) (0.170) (0.170) 
       
Observations 12,568 12,568 12,568 12,568 12,568 12,568 
R-squared 0.208 0.273 0.208 0.273 0.208 0.208 
village fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
village-year fixed effects no yes no yes no no 
households fixed effects in first 
stage yes yes yes yes yes yes 
village-year fixed effects in first 
stage no no yes yes no yes 
current rainfall no no no no yes yes 
Source: Authors calculations using data from the Ministry of Agriculture of Burkina Faso. 
Notes: *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level. 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the village level. The dependent variable is one for nuclear family households and 
zero for extended family households.  The regressions also control for household demographic characteristics (based on 
the nuclear family members) and head age and gender. Columns 1-2, 4-5, 7-8 and 10-11 also control for village level prices.  
